Photography, building and dwelling: Fiona Tan’s empty house by Kathryn Brown (2797087)
In The Poetics of Space, Gaston Bachelard argues that ‘all really inhabited 
space bears the essence of the notion of home’.1 For Bachelard, the 
imagination plays a key role in this idea: people build houses with the 
practical intention of securing shelter, but it is through the work of the 
imagination that such shelters become spaces of personal and collective 
memory, narrative and dreams. In this view, our physical relationship 
to the spaces we inhabit is augmented by imaginary attachments that 
symbolise a range of expressive values. The result, for Bachelard, is that 
we constantly inhabit the home in ‘its reality and in its virtuality’.2 
I shall argue in this chapter that the idea of the home as a space of 
physical and imaginary experience is key to the way in which dwelling 
is problematised in a suite of ten colour photographs entitled Empty 
House produced by Fiona Tan in 2010.3 Belying the title of the work, 
1 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1994), p. 5. 
2 Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, p. 5.
3 Fiona Tan was born in 1966 in Pekan Baru in Indonesia, grew up in Australia, 
and currently lives and works in the Netherlands. She represented the Netherlands 
at the Venice Biennale in 2009 and has held solo exhibitions at the Rijksmuseum, 
Amsterdam (2008), the SCAF Foundation, Sydney (2008), the Vancouver Art 
Gallery (2010), the Aargauer Kunsthaus, Aarau (2010), and the Freer and Sackler 
Galleries of the Smithsonian Institution, Washington DC (2010–11), among 
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the house shown in these photographs is replete with objects that range 
from the decorative to the functional and the disused. Having regard 
to such visible traces of habitation, I shall examine the imaginative 
response that is triggered by Tan’s imagery in order to question her 
portrayal of tensions between spaces that simply provide shelter and 
those that foster a notion of dwelling. Although the house is clearly 
inhabited, I shall show how Tan’s photographs form a counter-example 
to Bachelard’s suggestion that such signs of habitation support a notion 
of ‘home’. 
In order to develop this thesis, I shall locate Tan’s photographs in 
the context of Martin Heidegger’s discussion of ‘dwelling’ in his essay 
‘Building Dwelling Thinking’.4 First delivered as a lecture in 1951, 
Heidegger’s essay uses the twinned themes of building and dwelling 
to characterise an ethical relationship between humans and their 
environment. Having regard to Heidegger’s enquiry into links between 
building, dwelling and preserving, I shall discuss the techniques that 
Tan uses to portray the home as an unsettling space and show how her 
images raise metaphysical questions about the way in which we inhabit 
the world. 
objects and interiors
Much of Tan’s work is concerned with relationships between personal 
identity, historical narrative and place. Each volume in her series of 
artist’s books, Vox Populi (2006–12), for example, provides a glimpse 
of a particular country or city and its inhabitants. Using informal 
family photographs taken by people living in Tokyo, London and 
Sydney, or towns and villages in Switzerland and Norway, Tan builds 
up a series of touching, but often ironic portraits of ways in which 
places convey a particular lifestyle, foster social relations and cultivate 
others. The photographs comprising Empty House are pigment prints on archival 
paper (41.3 × 27.5 cm) and were exhibited at the Frith Street Gallery, London in 
2010. 
4 Martin Heidegger, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ (henceforth BDT) in Martin 
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper 
Perennial Classics, 2001), pp. 141–60.
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concepts of localness.5 Relations between personal experience and 
socio-historic tradition are, however, never stable in Tan’s works, and 
clashes between them typically undermine any clear or permanent 
attachment to an identifiable homeland. Forgetfulness, migration and 
shifting geopolitical boundaries are only some of the tropes that the 
artist uses for the purpose of figuring disorientation and undermining 
individuals’ identification with the places in which they live or have 
lived. As Okwui Enwezor has aptly pointed out in relation to the 
structure of Tan’s films, layers of open-ended narrative impose infinite 
perspectives on specific locations, much like the effect generated by a 
‘hall of mirrors’.6 
In contrast to the complications of locale that arise in much of 
Tan’s filmic work, Empty House depicts a series of rooms that are 
visually isolated from the external world. Although windows can be 
seen in several images, a combination of frosted glass, net curtains 
and drawn blinds seals the interiors and prevents a clear view of 
the house’s physical surroundings. This visual compression establishes 
the boundaries of the home, but also conveys an unsettling sense of 
withdrawal. Whereas Robert Pogue Harrison argues that a house is 
a ‘dynamic field of interpenetration’ between interior and exterior, a 
space that comes alive by virtue of its openness to the surroundings, 
Tan’s photographs limit transparency and focus attention on shadowy 
corners and darkened recesses.7
Objects within the house are marked by the passage of time: a 
bundle of letters implies a lengthy period of accumulation, dust has 
formed on a glass surface, the plastic in which electric fans are wrapped 
suggests a change of season, and the measurement of time by means 
of a pendulum clock contrasts with the faded colours of an adjacent 
poster [Plate 20]. The theme of temporality is presented under a more 
5 Fiona Tan, Vox Populi, London (Aarau: Book Works, 2012); Vox Populi, 
Switzerland (Aarau: Book Works 2010); Vox Populi, Tokyo (Aarau: Book Works, 
2007); Vox Populi: Sydney (Aarau: Book Works, 2006); Vox Populi, Norway (Aarau: 
Book Works, 2006).
6 Okwui Enwezor, ‘A lapse of memory: allegory in the work of Fiona Tan’, in 
Bruce Grenville et al., Rise and Fall: Fiona Tan (exh. cat.) (Vancouver: Vancouver 
Art Gallery, 2009), pp. 79–89 (p. 89).
7 Robert Pogue Harrison, ‘What is a house?’, in Stephen Mulhall (ed.), Martin 
Heidegger (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 351–69 (p. 353).
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troubling aspect in the close-up of a telephone and a list of contacts 
from which names and numbers have been erased [Figure 10.1]. While 
the telephone places the house within a network of communication, 
the ever-shortening list implies a shrinking of the group of people with 
whom it is possible to communicate. 
The rooms themselves are replete with spatial divisions and 
containing structures, ranging from walls and door frames to cardboard 
storage boxes and plastic bags. Within these various repositories, objects 
mix Asian and European histories of manufacture and design, and 
functional items are juxtaposed with objects that are prized for their 
visual attractiveness.8 A photograph featuring the contents of a glass-
8 This mixing of cultural expression is a recurrent trope in Tan’s work. See, for 
10.1 Fiona Tan, Empty House, 10 
photographs (2010). Pigment print on 
archival paper, 41.3 × 27.5 cm
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fronted cabinet, for example, flattens the display values attaching to 
items as diverse as glassware, cups, napkins, ornaments and decorative 
trinkets [Figure 10.2]. The image contains no fixed point of interest and, 
instead, encourages the viewer’s gaze to range over a visual miscellany 
that, to use one of Roland Barthes’s metaphors, eschews the arresting 
force of a ‘punctum’.9 
Tan employs this structure in a more compositionally complex 
way in a photograph that combines a range of different containing 
example, the discussion of Lapse of Memory (2008) by Bruce Grenville, ‘Rise and 
fall: to remember is not to repeat’, in Grenville et al. Rise and Fall, pp. 25–37; 
Enwezor, ‘A lapse of memory’, pp. 84–8. 
9 Roland Barthes, La chambre claire: Note sur la photographie (Paris: Gallimard, 
1980), pp. 48–9.
10.2 Fiona Tan, Empty House, 10 
photographs (2010). Pigment print 
on archival paper, 41.3 × 27.5 cm
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structures [Plate 21]. As in the previous image, depth is truncated by 
the low camera placement, and a strong vertical line simultaneously 
bisects and draws together the two halves of the frame. It is as if the 
background table and its array of ornaments are brought forward to 
the same plane as the display case containing its elaborately dressed 
doll. This house of things disorients by disturbing the viewer’s sense of 
scale and proportion: the doll dominates the scene, but is diminished in 
size by an adjacent tea set and a string of pearls that has been placed, 
incongruously, next to a wicker basket on top of the cabinet. Shiny 
reflective surfaces impose points of invisibility within the photograph 
in a way that contrasts with the sharpened layer of dust on the glass 
cabinet comprising the lower right corner of the image. In this case, 
however, there is a point in the image that both arrests the viewer’s 
interest and captures a feature of the work as a whole, namely the 
raised left hand of the doll. A clichéd gesture of nineteenth-century 
femininity becomes an important rebuke to the viewer: we may be 
invited to examine the contents of the house, but there is a point of 
resistance that imposes a limitation on what we might deduce from 
those contents and how we respond to them imaginatively. The raised 
hand of the doll signifies the viewer’s exclusion from the house as a 
place of habitation. In order to develop this idea, I want to place Tan’s 
photographs in the context of two contrasting trends within contem-
porary photography.
In his book What Photography Is, James Elkins discusses photographs 
that are ostensibly devoid of people. He argues that even in works 
that eschew human presence, we are confronted by photographic 
conventions that seek to ‘conjure people’s lives with snapshots of 
kitchen pantries, clock radios on night stands, televisions turned off, 
leaning stacks of vinyl records, avalanches of books, or dust under 
the bed’.10 The result, he states, is that ‘most images without faces 
or people are actually full of people: they are places where people 
can find themselves in imagination’.11 The connection that Elkins 
makes between a photography of things and a photography of people 
presupposes an imaginative construction of ‘home’ that is reminiscent 
of Bachelard’s analysis that I quoted at the beginning of this chapter. 
10 James Elkins, What Photography Is (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 50. 
11 Elkins, What Photography Is, p. 50.
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Just as individuals use thoughts and dreams to imbue their own living 
spaces with meaning, so too viewers of other people’s dwelling spaces 
flesh out narratives of habitation, history and attachment. In Elkins’s 
account, the viewer’s imaginative response to such works consists in a 
reconstruction of, and temporary identification with, the lives of the 
absent occupiers.
It would be easy to place Tan’s Empty House within this visual 
tradition. However, I want to suggest that, in this particular case, her 
photographs resist such an interpretation and that this is part of their 
distinctive aesthetic interest and achievement. The display of objects 
marked by the passage of time provides no insight into the significance 
of the moment captured by the photographs or into the values that 
might attach to the objects themselves; the non-hierarchical jumble 
of decorative and functional items gives little idea of the interests and 
lifestyle of the unseen occupiers of the house; the rooms are full of 
the traces of human presence, yet the composition of the photographs 
prevents those spaces from cohering into a recognisable or comfortable 
living area. My contention is that the photographs fail to offer us a 
ground for imagining or empathising with the people to whom these 
things belong and that, as a result, they problematise the theme of 
dwelling in a particularly powerful way.
This feature of Empty House places the work within a style of 
contemporary photography that has been elaborated by Michael Fried 
and that contrasts with the genre identified by Elkins. With reference 
to works by Candida Höfer, Thomas Struth and Hiroshi Sugimoto, 
Fried suggests that spectatorial exclusion has become a major trope in 
ambitious art photography.12 Of the works discussed by Fried, Höfer’s 
unpopulated architectural spaces offer the closest analogy to Tan’s 
Empty House: they are plentiful interiors (usually public spaces), often 
ornately decorated, but devoid of human presence.13 In contrast to the 
imaginative recognition that Elkins finds in depictions of interiors that 
12 Michael Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 299.
13 Fried discusses Höfer’s Museo Civico, Vicenza II (1988), Neue Nationalgalerie 
Berlin VII (2001), Ca’ Dolfin Venezie I (2003), Ballettzentrum Hamburg III (2001), 
DHFK Leipzig IV (1991), Schindler House Los Angeles VII (2000) and Ca’ Rezzonico 
Venezia I (2003).
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bear the visual and physical traces of human life, Fried identifies an 
uneasy sense of detachment in Höfer’s imagery:
Despite the fact that the actual interiors are self-evidently places 
that in countless ways are phenomenologically keyed to the activities 
of incarnate human beings, the viewer of her [Höfer’s] photographs 
is not led to respond empathically to those keys […] but rather is 
induced to survey the pictures in question with a blend of heightened 
visual alertness and all but explicit bodily detachment.14
Fried argues that Höfer’s empty rooms emphasise visuality at the 
expense of the spectator’s imaginative self-placement within, or in 
relation to, the depicted spaces.15 He goes on to develop an analogy 
between these almost ‘traceless’ interiors and the pristine whiteness of 
the modernist art gallery, a space that Fried views as working against 
the embodied presence of the art viewer in a similar, though more 
directly physical way. From an undermining of empathic responses to 
Höfer’s spaces, Fried develops the idea of a quasi-physical ousting of 
the spectator from the depicted scenes (they are not spaces we would 
wish to inhabit). While this must remain at the level of metaphor as 
regards the relationship of the actual spectator to the image, a visual 
encounter with a photograph is envisaged by Fried as resonating at the 
level of the imagination while also suggesting an encounter with the 
parameters of the art gallery itself. 
The interiors depicted by Tan evoke levels of physical discomfort 
that are similar to those found in Höfer’s depopulated rooms. A striking 
feature of Empty House is the absence of spaces that promote rest or 
repose. Devoid of chairs, sofas or beds, there is no implied arena within 
which the viewer might imaginatively linger. Instead, restlessness is 
imposed on the gaze as it moves from room to room, from object to 
object. While this structural feature of the images contributes to the 
uncanny atmosphere in the house, the photographs make an even 
stronger point by figuring the viewer’s exclusion at a metaphysical 
level: we fail to experience the house as a space of dwelling because 
something has gone awry with the relationships that support that 
14 Fried, Why Photography Matters, p. 286.
15 Fried, Why Photography Matters, p. 286.
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notion. In this regard, we do share something with the inhabitants of 
the house, but this is far from the kind of imaginative reconstruction 
of other people’s lives as described by Elkins. I have identified various 
ways in which the photographs unsettle the viewer by virtue of their 
abrupt juxtapositions of scale, their absence of visual hierarchy, their 
uneasy relationship to the exterior and their failure to yield a personal 
history. The undoing of a sense of ‘dwelling’ rests, however, on the 
impact of the final two photographs of the series. Before turning to 
a discussion of these images, I want to consider what is meant by 
‘dwelling’ and, for this purpose, I turn to Heidegger’s elaboration of 
this idea.
The problem of dwelling
According to Heidegger, humans are beings who long to ‘dwell’. At its 
most basic, this implies a desire to house ourselves on earth among 
things that we cherish. The act of building is key to the execution of 
this desire, yet building is not envisaged by Heidegger as an activity 
that is separate from dwelling. Rather, by tracing etymological links 
between the old and modern German verbs ‘to build’ (bauen) and ‘to 
be’ (sein), Heidegger identifies linguistic resonances of dwelling in the 
act of being: ‘The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which 
we humans are on earth, is Baun, dwelling. To be a human being means 
to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell.’16 While the notions 
of building and dwelling are intertwined in Heidegger’s philosophy, 
he nevertheless makes a distinction between buildings that serve as 
purely functional spaces and those that are places of dwelling. He 
points out that we may build because we are dwellers, but that not every 
building has the values associated with a dwelling space.17 
In Heidegger’s writings, ‘dwelling’ is a loaded term that comprises 
a complex set of relations. The first of those relations that I want to 
consider in connection with Tan’s photographs concerns the act of 
‘preserving’ or ‘cherishing’. For Heidegger, building is not just an act of 
construction, but an ethical stance towards the environment, including 
16 Heidegger, BDT, p. 145.
17 Heidegger, BDT, pp. 143–4, 146–7.
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both the natural world and the people and things that make up our 
everyday experience. This emphasis on the act of building is an aspect 
of Heidegger’s notion of dwelling that has provoked feminist criticism. 
Iris Marion Young, for example, has argued that against an allegedly 
universal, but actually ‘heroic’ notion of building, Heidegger posits 
the related, but less valuable act of preserving. Although not explicit 
in Heidegger’s philosophy, it is argued that the former is, in practice, 
gendered as male, while the latter has all the hallmarks of undervalued 
domestic work traditionally undertaken by women within the space of 
the home.18 
While I agree with the historical and sociological reality of the 
point that Young makes about women’s association with work in the 
domestic sphere, I think it is misleading to view the act of preserving 
in Heidegger’s philosophy as an activity that is subordinate to building 
or that is implicitly gendered as female. On the contrary, ‘building’ and 
‘preserving’ are intimately linked in Heidegger’s writings on this subject. 
He states, for example, that the ‘fundamental character of dwelling is 
this sparing and preserving. It pervades dwelling in its whole range.’19 
For Heidegger, the act of preserving cannot be separated from dwelling 
and, hence, from building. Dwelling does not simply consist in the act 
of constructing edifices, but is informed by the manner in which we 
inhabit the premises we create. Preserving and cherishing objects (and 
hence our relationship to them and to the world around us) is a crucial 
way in which value is inscribed in dwelling.
The relationships between building, dwelling and preserving are 
key to the aesthetic impact of Tan’s Empty House. While the depicted 
interiors reveal a history of preservation in their array of objects, they 
also occupy a fine line between care and neglect. This point comes 
to the fore most forcefully in the penultimate, and most abstract, 
photograph of the series [Figure 10.3]. Reiterating the themes of framing 
and enclosure that I discussed above, the window comprising this 
photograph precludes any view of the outside world. In fact, the density 
of its different textures and frosting means that it barely functions as 
18 Iris Marion Young, ‘House and home: feminist variations on a theme’, 
in Nancy J. Holland and Patricia Huntington (eds), Feminist Interpretations of 
Martin Heidegger (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 
pp. 252–88 (p. 273).
19 Heidegger, BDT, p. 147.
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a source of illumination. A faint shaft of sunlight is visible in the lower 
left rectangle, but the edges recede into shadow. The cropped rigorous 
pattern of the inner frames evokes the abstract figuration of a painting 
by Mondrian, but traces of breakage and repair reinforce the window’s 
materiality as an object. The glass is dirty and, importantly for the 
present analysis, the upper right-hand panel is broken. It bears the 
signs of a lengthy history of failed restoration: taping has peeled off 
and, in some places, has been reapplied. The broken segments can no 
longer be made to form a coherent surface, however, and gaps remain 
unsealed. This image of breakage prepares the viewer for the final 
image in the series. 
The sole glimpse of an outdoor scene confronts us with the real 
‘empty house’ of the title: a disused Shinto shrine that is devoid of 
sacred objects [Figure 10.4]. It is a barren space within a structure that 
10.3 Fiona Tan, Empty House, 10 
photographs (2010). Pigment print 
on archival paper, 41.3 × 27.5 cm
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is weathered and worn. Following the image of breakage that I have 
just discussed, it is this neglected house of the absent divinity that 
undermines a notion of dwelling by calling into question what it means 
to be at home in the world.
I have already noted that, for Heidegger, dwelling comprises the 
twinned ideas of building and preserving and, as such, it implies an 
ethical stance to the world. In this account, the term ‘preservation’ 
implies much more than the cherishing of objects and becomes key to a 
set of relations that support dwelling. Heidegger terms this the preser-
vation of the ‘fourfold’, a sense of belonging or ‘oneness’ between ‘earth 
and sky, divinities and mortals’.20 Julian Young notes that the ‘fourfold’ 
20 Heidegger, BDT, pp. 147–8.
10.4 Fiona Tan, Empty House, 10 
photographs (2010). Pigment print on 
archival paper, 41.3 × 27.5 cm
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is essentially a spatial metaphor; it connotes a terrain of habitation 
that is bounded by the natural elements of earth and sky, by awareness 
of our own mortality, and by the values (not necessary spiritual ones) 
that bind communities together and give them an identity.21 To dwell 
properly, for Heidegger, means to allow these four things to become 
present to us and, hence, to preserve the relationships that sustain 
that presence. It is this aspect of Heidegger’s account of dwelling that, 
in my view, sits uneasily with the feminist critique of ‘building’ that 
I mentioned above. For Heidegger, building facilitates preservation of 
the fourfold in so far as it allows mortals, divinities, earth and sky to 
‘be’ together (they are present to each other). Far from a mastery of 
nature or the achievement of heroic acts of construction, ‘building’ 
consists in the cultivation of a more passive relation to the world or, 
as Heidegger puts it, ‘a distinctive letting-dwell’.22 
Returning to Tan’s Empty House, the image of the empty and 
abandoned shrine need not be interpreted as the erosion of a particular 
religious or spiritual way of life, but rather as the symbol of a breakdown 
in valuing (cherishing) the world and our place in it. As an image 
of abandonment, it crystallises the unsettling themes that I have 
discussed in connection with the other photographs in the suite. If 
this is so, however, the question arises as to what has happened to 
undermine the house, its contents and its shrine as a space of dwelling? 
Alternatively, to take up Heidegger’s metaphor, why are we left among 
the traces of the vanished gods?
21 Julian Young, ‘The Fourfold’ in Charles B. Guignon, The Cambridge Companion 
to Heidegger, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 373–92. 
See also Christine Swanton’s interpretation of the ‘gods’ in Heidegger’s writings 
as ‘culturally significant’ objects. Christine Swanton, ‘Heideggerian environ-
mental virtue ethics’, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (2010), 
pp. 145–66 (p. 150).
22 Heidegger, BDT, p. 156. See also Julian Young’s description of Heidegger’s 
‘guardians’ who, instead of seeking to ‘bulldoze a new order of things’, attempt 
to uncover the potential that already inheres in particular places. Young, ‘The 
fourfold’, p. 379. 
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From spoilation to rebuilding
So far, my interpretation of Empty House has focused solely on the 
content of the photographs. While, from an aesthetic perspective, this 
approach would be sufficient in its own right, the trajectory traced in 
this chapter gains further strength by contextualising the work within 
the history of its production. The photographs for Empty House were 
taken by Tan during production of her film Cloud Island, a work shown 
at the 2010 Venice Architecture Biennale.23 The location for Empty 
House, like much of the film itself, was the small island of Inujima in 
the Seto Island Sea off the coast of Japan. Like other nearby islands, 
Inujima was once a symbol of Japan’s industrial progress and housed a 
large copper refinery. Ten years after its construction in 1909, however, 
the refinery was closed following a drop in the price of copper.24 The 
crumbling and disused factory buildings remain visible on the island 
that is now home to an ageing population. 
Inujima is at once a place of habitation and ruin, of growth and 
abandonment. A natural environment that was radically altered for the 
purposes of technological advancement has been left untended in the 
wake of economic pressure. This unhappy history sums up a theme that 
runs throughout Heidegger’s work, namely concern about the impact 
of industrial technologies on the environment and our relationship to 
it.25 My contention is that the unsettling imagery of Tan’s Empty House 
is deeply linked to broader questions concerning the way in which the 
environment of the house has been affected by industrialisation. The 
23 Fiona Tan, Cloud Island, two-channel HD installation, colour, stereo, 
two HD-cam safety masters, two HD projectors, two hard disk players, two 
stereo amplifiers, four stereo speakers, one double-sided white projection screen 
2.0 × 1.12 m, Venice Architecture Biennale, 2010. Subsequently shown at the 
Frith Street Gallery, London (2010).
24 For further background information on Inujima and its industrial heritage, 
see Yuki Sumner and Naomi Pollock (with David Littlefield), New Architecture in 
Japan (London and New York: Merrell, 2010), pp. 70–1.
25 Heidegger, BDT, p. 148. It is this aspect of Heidegger’s notion of dwelling that 
has made his philosophy particularly relevant to recent discussions in environ-
mental ethics. See, for example, Michael Zimmerman, ‘Heidegger, Buddhism, and 
deep ecology’, in Charles B. Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 
2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 293–325; Swanton, 
‘Heideggerian environmental virtue ethics’, pp. 145–52.
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objects within the house are presented as things to which we cannot 
ascribe a value in a wider context of dwelling. 
It is important to note, however, that Heidegger’s suspicion about 
the impact of technology on our relationship to each other and to the 
environment is neither wholly negative, nor limited to the physical 
impact of ‘spoilation’. Dispensing with the idea that technology is 
simply a form of making or manufacturing, Heidegger conceives of a 
positive and productive notion of techné as a form of ‘revealing’.26 Like 
its artistic counterpart, poetry, technology is capable of functioning as 
a ‘bringing-forth’ of truth, namely a revelation of Being itself. However, 
it is the way in which we have used technology that has, according to 
Heidegger, obscured this positive potential. Our attitude to, and use of, 
technology has led us to see the world as primarily a set of resources, a 
‘standing-reserve’ that is ready for exploitation. As Bernard Yack aptly 
notes, this concern about the instrumental way in which we view the 
world encompasses a fundamental problem of thought itself: 
Heidegger is hardly so foolish as to believe that we are reaching 
the point of gaining complete control over the forces of nature. But 
he does believe that the instrumental understanding of the world 
embedded in the modern project is crowding out all other ways of 
relating to being.27 
It is this ‘crowding out’ of other ways of imagining our relationship to 
the world that informs Tan’s imagery and that undermines the notion 
of dwelling in the photographs. It is not simply that Inujima is revealed 
to be a failed technological project that negatively impacts on its ability 
to serve as a space of dwelling, but rather that, for many years, there 
was no other conceivable use of the island.
A change in this state of affairs occurred, however, in 2007. 
26 Martin Heidegger, ‘The question concerning technology’, in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1977), pp. 3–35 (pp. 12–14).
27 Bernard Yack, The Fetishism of Modernities: Epochal Self-Consciousness 
in Contemporary Social and Political Thought (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1997), p. 120. See also Don Ihde, Heidegger’s Technologies: 
Postphenomenological Perspectives (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 
pp. 34–7.
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Designated a national heritage site, Inujima has received sponsorship 
from the Benesse Art Site Naoshima and has been redesigned as an 
‘ecological art space’.28 Architect Hiroshi Sambuichi, who is responsible 
for much of the reconstruction of the island, has designed architecture 
that ‘recycles’ the disused industrial buildings and integrates them into 
the geology and flora of the island.29 Yukinori Yanagi, an artist who 
has also participated in the project, takes this process of design and 
integration a step further when describing the aim of the Inujima Art 
House project as being ‘to transform the island into art’.30
I want to suggest that the regeneration of Inujima both as an 
architectural space designed to support the ecology of the environment 
and as a forum for art viewing provides a reorientation of the theme 
of dwelling. We need to understand Tan’s photographs not just as a 
commentary on the effects of a failed industry, but also as an act of 
making that reflects on the recent alterations to the island and, hence, 
on the lives of the people who inhabit it.31 I am not suggesting that the 
regeneration of the island as a museum space should be viewed simply 
as a potential new resource stream or tourist attraction (although there 
would be nothing inherently wrong in this). Instead, my suggestion 
is that this combined art and architecture project reinvigorates a 
notion of dwelling as it applies to this particular environment. In 
answer to Heidegger’s problem of technology, it does so by fostering a 
new conception of our place in the world and our relationship to the 
environment. 
I mentioned above Bernard Yack’s point that one of Heidegger’s 
criticisms of technology was that it ‘crowded out other ways of 
thinking’. I linked this idea to the imaginative failure inherent in the 
abandonment of Inujima as a productive space throughout most of the 
twentieth century. Art (in the form of photography and architecture) 
redresses this balance of thought: it recasts the island as a space of 
28 Further details of the projects can be found on Benesse Art Site website: 
http://www.benesse-artsite.jp/en/ (accessed 20 June 2012). 
29 See also Sumner et al., New Architecture in Japan, pp. 70–3.
30 Quote from Yukinori Yanagi’s website, http://www.yanagistudio.net/
profiel_eng.html (accessed 26 May 2012).
31 For further details, see the ‘Inujima Art House Project’ description on the 
Benesse Art Site Naoshima website: http://www.benesse-artsite.jp/en/inujima-
arthouse/index.html. (accessed 20 June 2012).
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dwelling by offering a way of thinking about the world that counters a 
valuing of the environment solely as a repository of resources available 
for exploitation. As Don Ihde puts it, in Heidegger’s philosophy, art and 
technology ‘belong to the danger and possible salvation of the same 
epoch of Being’, but art (as techné) enables us to ‘say Being’ in a way 
that is different from its technological counterpart.32 In other words, 
art is capable of fostering a set of relations between humans and the 
world that is not based on an instrumental attachment to the things 
that comprise our surroundings.
The purpose of this chapter has been to show that art production 
(in this case photography) can be understood as an act of making that 
promotes dwelling. Tan’s work achieves this through the contrast it 
promotes between the content of the photographs (a failed notion of 
dwelling) and the broader context of their production (the potential 
attaching to restoration of the island). Towards the end of ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’, Heidegger writes: ‘because it produces things as 
locations, building is closer to the nature of spaces and to the origin 
of the nature of “space” than any geometry and mathematics. Building 
puts up locations that make space as a site for the fourfold.’33 In a 
gloss on this idea, my suggestion is that Empty House encourages us 
to understand art itself as a form of ‘building’, namely a making of 
space within thought that prompts us to consider our relationship to 
the world in a new way and that allows us to dwell ‘poetically’. This 
approach is warranted by Heidegger’s own conclusion in ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’. He states: ‘Enough will have been gained [from the 
essay] if dwelling and building have become worthy of questioning and 
thus have remained worthy of thought.’34 In this chapter, I have tried to 
show that Tan’s Empty House makes dwelling worthy of questioning in 
precisely this way and that, as a result, it signals the importance of art 
in sustaining a set of values that enable us to be at home in the world. 
32 Ihde, Heidegger’s Technologies, p. 41. See also Julian Young, Heidegger’s 
Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 36–8.
33 Heidegger, BDT, p. 156.
34 Heidegger, BDT, p. 158.
